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1 Introduction
In the most prominent theoretical models of oligopolistic competition, going back to
Cournot (1838), Bertrand (1883) and Edgeworth (1925), firms only make decisions on
one variable: price or quantity. These models have proven to be extremely useful for
the study of a large variety of issues. However, for a more complete view of imperfect
competition one needs to go beyond this, since firms’ actual decision environments surely
involve quite a number of dimensions. A natural step forward is to study situations in
which firms decide on both price and quantity.
Competition in prices and quantities can be modeled in diﬀerent ways. One of these
ways is the ”supply function” approach proposed by Grossman (1981) and Hart (1982).
Here firms’ strategies consist in complete functions of price-quantity pairs. The outcomes
of market competition are the equilibria in supply functions; production is to order so
that there is neither over nor underproduction.
Kreps & Scheinkman (1983) approached price-quantity competition using a two stage
model in which firms decide on capacities first and then compete in prices. They solved
the problem of inexistence of equilibrium in the so called Bertrand-Edgeworth model in
which due to capacity restrictions there is no equilibrium in pure strategies. In their game
firms actually first decide on capacities and then on prices. This two stage structure plus
a surplus-maximizing rationing rule yields Cournot outcomes.
A simpler more direct way of representing price-quantity competition is to let firms
decide on price and quantity combinations where the quantities have to be produced in
advance and the demand buys from the cheapest producer(s). This is characteristic of
many retail markets. The fact that total production can now be larger than total sales
raises the question of what happens with the overproduced quantity. Underproduction
also needs to be taken into consideration. The produced good may be completely perish-
able or not. If the good is of some durability, then unsold production may be carried over
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from one production period to another one, implying a dynamic situation. Theoretically,
the first case has been studied by Maskin (1986) and Friedman (1988) and the second by
Judd (1990).
Experimentally, price-quantity competition with advance production of a perishable
good has been studied by Mestelman and Welland (1988). They investigate the eﬀects of
advance production in posted price and double auction markets with the kind of demand
and supply functions with multiple steps that are standard in experimental economics.
They compare the performance of the posted price institution with and without advance
production and find that for the first case price and eﬃciency levels are both somewhat
lower than in the second case. However, even with advance production, after 15 trading
rounds both prices and the distribution of the surplus are very close to the ones corre-
sponding to the Walrasian outcome. Mestelman and Welland (1991) study the case with
advance production and inventory carryover and find similar results as for a perishable
good.
In this paper we study the performance of experimental markets with posted prices
and advance production of a perishable good with simple demand and cost schedules.
The simulated demand has a ”box-shape”, i.e. it is willing to buy a constant maximum
quantity for any price up to a maximum. Firms have identical constant marginal costs
and a capacity limit. As shown below, this simplified structure facilitates the theoretical
analysis and the comparison to previous results with other market rules.
We have several aims. First, we want to find out whether price-quantity competi-
tion behaves more like pure quantity or more like pure price competition. In our set-up
these two types of interaction lead to very diﬀerent predictions and existing experimental
results also exhibit very diﬀerent behavioral patterns. Bertrand and Cournot are often
used as benchmarks in the context of the analysis of oligopoly. Our results provide an
experimental benchmark for price-quantity competition.
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Second, we want to study the impact of the number of firms on market outcomes,
specifically on price and eﬃciency levels and on the distribution of the surplus between
consumers and producers. For that purpose we compare experimental markets with two
and three firms.
Third, we also study the evolution of behavior over time to shed light on how outcomes
emerge as the result of the interaction process. In our experiments subjects interact in+
the same market throughout 50 rounds. This reflects the repeated interaction that takes
place in actual oligopoly markets. It is also the way in which most, although not all,
market experiments are conducted. We study how players adjust to others’ behavior over
time and bring about the observed data patterns.
Our experiment is meant to be a contribution to a more general view of how imperfect
competition over time relates to the equilibria of certain static games. Theoretical studies
of dynamic oligopoly like those of Maskin and Tirole (1987, 1988) and Jun and Vives
(1999) typically characterize equilibrium behavior in relation to the static Cournot and
Bertrand equilibria. Our results will shed - from a diﬀerent perspective - some additional
light on the comparison between dynamic behavior and static predictions.
With our work we also wish to contribute to a more complete view of the impact
of the number of firms on market performance in experimental imperfect competition
environments. This issue is one of the central themes of the economic analysis of oligopoly
and can be seen as transversal with respect to diﬀerent specific oligopoly models. It
has recently been analyzed in a number of experimental studies with diﬀerent types of
imperfect competition. Dufwenberg and Gneezy (2000) address this question for the case
of Bertrand price competition among identical firms with constant marginal costs and
inelastic demand. Their results are that prices are above marginal cost for the case of two
firms but equal to that cost for three and four firms.
Abbink and Brandts (2002a) examine the eﬀects of the number of firms in a price com-
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petition environment in which firms operate under decreasing returns to scale and have
to serve the whole market; there are multiple equilibria with positive price-cost margins.
The most frequently observed market price is invariant to the number of firms. However,
average prices do decrease with the number of firms, partially due to the declining preva-
lence of collusion. Abbink and Brandts (2002b) study price competition under constant
but uncertain marginal costs. In accordance with the theoretical prediction for this case,
market prices decrease significantly with the number of firms but stay above marginal
costs.
Several studies report experimental results on related issues from quantity competition
environments. Huck, Normann and Oechssler (1999, 2001) provide results and a recent
survey of work on the eﬀects of market concentration under repeated quantity compe-
tition. Their conclusion is that duopolists sometimes manage to collude, but that in
markets with more than three firms collusion is diﬃcult. In many instances, total average
output exceeds the Nash prediction and furthermore, these deviations are increasing in
the number of firms. The study by Brandts, Pezanis-Christou and Schram (2003) includes
evidence that shows how repeated quantity competition with three and four firms with
convex marginal costs is consistent with the one-shot prediction.1 In a broad sense one
can say that the price-cost margins found in experimental repeated quantity competition
are qualitatively consistent with the Cournot prediction for the static game.2
Recall that our third aim was to study the evolution of behavior over time. The study
of how adjustment over time takes place under imperfect competition is important, be-
cause it may give - as shown for instance in Selten, Mitzkewitz and Uhlich (1997) - insights
into the rationale behind subjects’ behavior. Our data exhibit a considerable adjustment
1They also find that under supply function competition, an increase in the number of firms also leads
to lower prices.
2Oﬀerman, Potters and Sonnemans (2002) also study experimental quantity competition, but focus
on the eﬀects of diﬀerent information environments and not on the impact of changing the number of
firms.
5
stage of about fifteen rounds, during which price and eﬃciency levels increase. During
this stage we also observe fights for the market, some of them leading to bankruptcies.
With enough experience we observe considerable tacit collusion at the demand’s reser-
vation price, somewhat more so for the case of two than for three firms. In this sense,
behavior tends more to what one should expect under quantity competition than to what
price competition would yield. Behavior settles down at a price-quantity configuration
which is not an equilibrium.
All this is somewhat reminiscent of the view proposed by Chamberlin (1962) for the
case of markets in which firms face each other repeatedly. He thought that for the case
of few sellers behavior follows from the very structure of the industry. In Chamberlin
(1962), p. 48, he states: ”If each one [seller] seeks its maximum profit rationally and
intelligently, he will realize that when there are two or a few sellers his own move has a
considerable eﬀect upon his competitors, and that this makes it idle to suppose that they
will accept without retaliation the losses he forces upon them. Since the results of a cut
by any one is inevitably to decrease its own profits, no one will cut, and, although the
sellers are entirely independent, the equilibrium result is the same as though there were a
monopolistic agreement between them”.Indeed, in the process of fighting that we observe
in our data, firms appear to realize how disadvantageous this behavior is and learn to
avoid it.
In Section 2 we discuss our basic set-up choices and present some theoretical consid-
erations for the game we study. In Section 3 we present design details and explain the
experimental procedures. Section 4 presents our results. There are three appendixes.
Appendix A contains the instructions, Appendix B includes Overall Tables and Appendix
C contains graphs for all experimental markets in both treatments.
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2 Basic Set-up and Theoretical Considerations
In our game, the demand is willing to buy any amount of the good up to a quantity of qmax
at a constant maximum price of 100. This kind of ’box’ demand schedule has previously
been used for the study of double auctions by Holt, Langan and Villamil (1986) and more
recently by Dufwenberg and Gneezy (2000) for the study of Bertrand competition. The
buyer auction studied in Roth et al. (1991) has very similar features. This simple set-
up has several advantages which will become clear below. We conducted experimental
sessions with two and three firms, with qmax being 100 in the first case and, to allow for
divisibility, 102 in the second case.3
Each of the n firms has the capacity of producing integer quantities up to qmax units at
a constant marginal cost of 50 with no fixed costs. Each firm can serve the whole demand
at marginal cost, just as typically assumed for standard price or quantity competition.
Firms simultaneously and independently decide on production quantities and on prices
between 0 and qmax. Once the production decisions are made, the quantities are produced
instantaneously and the corresponding costs are incurred. Each firm oﬀers all its produced
units at the same price. It is as if they attached a label with the price on each unit of
output. One can think of this situation as one in which two factories produce a perishable
good like, say yogurt, and send it to the supermarket at a previously decided price.
Given the shape of the demand, if total production is less or equal than qmax all units
are sold regardless of prices. If total production is higher than qmax, then sales will depend
on the prices set by the diﬀerent producers. Taking the case of three firms, then if all
three prices are diﬀerent from each other the demand simply goes from lower to higher
prices and keeps purchasing until it reaches 102; due to the type of demand schedule no
rationing rule is needed. Some of the units of the highest price firm will remain unsold
and are lost, since the good is completely perishable. There are several other possibilities
3Because 102 divided by 3 equals 34, an integer.
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in which two of the firms set the same price, which is diﬀerent from the one set by the
third firm. If two firms set the same price which is lower than the one of the third firm
and the sum of the produced quantities of the two firms is smaller than 102, then we are,
in essence, in the same situation as when all three prices are diﬀerent from each other.
The two firms with the lowest price both sell their whole production and some of the units
of the high price firm will not be sold.
If all three prices are the same, then consumers will buy from the diﬀerent firms in
proportion to the produced quantities: If the three firms have produced quantities q1, q2
and q3 then firm i will have sales of si = qiq1+q2+q3 ∗ 102 and the rest of the units of firm i’s
produced units will remain unsold, i = 1, 2, 3.More production leads to more presence in
the market and, hence, to more sales.
If two firms set the same price which is lower than the third one and the joint produc-
tion of the first two firms is higher than 102, then a proportionality rule applies, which is
analogous to the one for the case where all three firms set the same price: If the quantities
of the two low-price firms are q1 and q2, then the sales of firm i will be si = qiq1+q2 ∗ 102,
i = 1, 2; the high-price firm sells nothing. If two firms set the same price which is higher
than the one of the remaining firm, then the same proportionality rule applies as in the
previous case to the quantity that still can be sold after the low-price firms has sold all
its production, i.e. if q1 and q2 are now the quantities of the two high-price firms and
q3 corresponds to the one low-price firm, then the sales of the two first firms will be
qi
q1+q2 (102− q3), i = 1, 2.
Note that in the box design price-quantity game pure price competition would be
predicted to yield prices equal to marginal cost. The experimental study by Dufwenberg
and Gneezy (2000) referred to above deals precisely with the case of a box-demand and
presents evidence consistent with this prediction. In contrast pure quantity competition
would lead, in the Cournot equilibrium, to the monopoly price equal to the demand’s
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reservation value. We are not aware of any quantity competition experimental study with
this kind of demand. However, it is reasonable to expect that in experimental studies of
this type the stage-game Nash equilibrium will be a good predictor of behavior.
In contrast, for the price-quantity competition we consider there exists no equilibrium
in pure strategies. We present the reasoning for two firms; it can be easily generalized for
any number of firms greater than two.
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Figures 1 and 2. Jumping-Up
Let [(p¯1, q¯1) , (p¯2, q¯2)] be a strategy profile and focus first on the quantity choices. Note
first that if q¯1+ q¯2 < qmax then the strategy of any of the players is (weakly) dominated by
a strategy in which the produced amount equals qmax, i.e. at any price between 50 and 100
both firms would benefit from expanding their production until joint production reaches
qmax. If q¯1 + q¯2 > qmax then each of the players has an incentive to reduce production.
This is so, because of the unit cost being 50, which is equal to the highest possible profit
per unit. Due to the proportionality rules a reduction of production by one unit leads
to a reduction in sales of less than one unit; foregone unit profits are hence less than 50
while saved costs are 50. If unit costs were zero firms would have an incentive to always
throw their total capacity on the market. Our parameter choices can, hence, be expected
to lead to the simple situation in which production ends up being equal to sales.
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Now to prices. Observe first that if a firm’s price is below 100 and is producing
a positive amount then a unilateral increase in price will always be profitable. This
’jumping-up’ is illustrated by the contrast between Figures 1 and 2, where in Figure 1
we have chosen to represent both firms producing the same quantity at marginal cost. A
unilateral increase of firms 2’s price leads to the positive profit represented by the shaded
area. At p1 = p2 = 100 there is no possibility of unilateral price increases, but in this
case unilateral under-cutting and expansion production to qmax will always be profitable
for at least one of the firms, since the demand will only buy from the firm with the lower
price. For instance, if s1 = 49 and s2 = 51, then the undercutting to a price of 99
with a simultaneous production expansion to 100 will be profitable for either firm. (This
’under-cutting’ is illustrated in Figures 3 and 4).
This only stops being true for firms with very high sales, the threshold being at 98
units. If a firm sells 99 or 100 units then undercutting will not be profitable, since in that
case the firm is already a virtual monopolist. But, of course, in this case it is the other
firm that will have a strong incentive to undercut. Hence, there is no equilibrium in pure
actions.4
Since the game actually played in the experiments is finite, we know that there does
exist an equilibrium in mixed strategies. The mixing will be over two variables and involve
a payoﬀ matrix of (101×101)n cells. We will not consider the mixed strategy equilibrium.
Indeed, as with applications to many other real contexts, taking it in account would not be
very natural in our environment. In addition, even a large experiment may not generate
enough data to reliably check the use of such a strategy. In the results section we will see
that observed behavior does not suggest at all the use of any kind of mixed strategy.
Up to this point we have analyzed the one shot game. In our experiments we run 50
periods, our game is finitely repeated. Applying backwards induction we have the same
4If the market is shared 50-50 at a price of 51, there are no incentives to undercut, and at a price of
52 firms are indiﬀerent between undercutting and expanding production or staying put.
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lack of equilibrium in pure strategies. However some experimental results (see Selten,
Mitzkewitz and Uhlich (1997)), claim that people actually behave like in an infinitely
repeated game when the number of periods is large enough and the end of the game
is far away.5 If we think of our game as an infinitely repeated one, any result can be
maintained in time if the discount factor, is high enough. In particular cooperation, to
share the market at the monopolistic price could be maintained until a few periods before
the last one. In the theoretical approach the threat that maintains collusion is typically
considered to be Nash reversion, but in looser, broader terms one may think of the threat
being any kind of fight for the market. We will get back to this issue when we discuss the
results.
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Figures 3 and 4. Under-Cutting
5Vives (1999) discusses the possible rationalizations of cooperation in finitely repeated games.
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3 Experimental design
We obtained data from two experimental treatments. One with two firms (hereafter, 2F)
and another one with three firms (hereafter, 3F).6 In treatment 2F each firm chooses a
quantity between 0 and 100 and one price (expressed in ECUs, Experimental Currency
Units) also between 0 and 100. There is a constant cost of 50 ECUs per unit produced.
Treatment 3F only diﬀers in the number of firms and in that they can choose production
levels from 0 to 102.
To accommodate losses we granted subjects an initial capital balance of 20,000 ECUs.
If a firm lost more than this starting money it was considered bankrupt and forced to
abandon the market. However, to preserve anonymity subjects that went bankrupt were
asked to remain in their place until the end of the experimental session. Bankruptcies did
actually occur in both our treatments so that monopolies appeared in 2F and doupolies
and monopolies appeared in 3F. We will elaborate on this in the experimental results
section.
As mentioned above fixed groups of subjects interacted in the same market during
50 rounds to represent the repeated nature of oligopolistic interaction. We conducted 14
markets of the 2F treatment and 9 markets of the 3F treatment. Below we consider each
separate market to be one independent observation.
We ran all the experiments in the ”LeeX” (Laboratori d’Economia Experimental) at
Universitat Pompeu Fabra in Barcelona during the second half of the year 2002. The
experiments were programmed using Urs Fischbacher’s zTree toolbox. The total earnings
of a subject from participating in this experiment were equal to his capital balance plus
the sum of all the profits he made during the experiment minus the sum of his losses.
We paid to each subject 2 EUR as a show-up fee and their profits at the rate of 2 cents
of Euro per 100 ECU earned. Experiments lasted approximately one hour and a half.
6Appendix A contains instructions for the case of three firms.
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Average earnings in the experiment were 16.5 EUR.
4 Experimental results
Figure 5 shows for both treatments the evolution of average weighted market prices,
defined as the average of prices at which units were sold weighted by their respective
market shares7. These averages include prices from all markets, among them those in
which firms went bankrupt.8 Below we will distinguish between behavior in markets with
and without bankruptcies. Observe first that for both the cases of two and of three firms
average weighted prices are evidently much closer to the quantity competition Cournot
equilibrium than to the price competition Bertrand equilibrium. Prices actually appear
to tend to the highest possible one. Stage-game equilibrium analysis does not suggest
this, but - after the fact - it seems quite plausible that a reduced number of firms is able
to establish high prices in a situation of (albeit, finitely) repeated interaction. Below we
elaborate on how these prices come about.
Note first that the prices shown in Figure 5 exhibit upward trends; for n=2 prices
stabilize after fifteen periods whereas for n=3 the trend appears to continue for a longer
interval. Prices are about 50% higher in final rounds than in early ones. One can see that
experiments with fewer rounds would have given an inappropriate impression of behavior
for this kind of interaction.
7For technical reasons, we had to end one of the sessions of the 2F treatment in round 47. For this
reason we only show the average weighted price up to that round.
8Appendix B presents price and quantity data disaggregated by rounds and markets.
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Figure 5. Average Weighted Price series, 2F and 3F
We nowmove to the comparison of behavior in 2F and 3F. We first describe the data at
a descriptive level and then move to the presentation of statistical test results. Observe
that prices for n=2 are always above those for n=3; for this last case we observe that
prices go down a little in the last 3-4 rounds. This is the so-called end eﬀect that has
been observed before (see, for example, Selten and Stoecker (1986)) and is here intuitively
plausible: Firms behave less cooperatively when the end of the experiment comes near.
Figure 6 shows the evolution of average total quantities over time for both treatments.
Recall that any quantity beyond 100 in 2F and 102 in 3F can not be sold and is a pure
loss. The Figure exhibits somewhat higher quantity levels for about 15 rounds; from then
on total quantity fluctuates somewhat above 100 (102).9 In this case visual inspection
does not directly suggest a treatment diﬀerence.
9See the previous footnote for why the data for the 2F treatment extend only to round 47.
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Figure 6. Average Quantity series, 2F and 3F
Figure 7 shows the evolution of average eﬃciency levels over time. The highest possible
surplus is 5000 ECU’s, which corresponds to the case where total production is equal to
100%. Eﬃciency is defined as the sum, in ECU’s, of consumer and producer surplus as
a fraction of 5000.10 In our context ineﬃciency can only be the outcome of too little
or too much production, with standard production ineﬃciency, i.e. less productive firms
producing instead of more productive ones, not being possible. The data in Figure 7
suggest that eﬃciency for n=2 tends to be above that for n=3.
10Note that in the case of three firms eﬃciency can be negative, since high overproduction may make
total costs larger than consumer surplus.
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Figure 7. Average Efficiency series, 2F and 3F
In Tables 1 and 2 we show average weighted price (AWP), average quantities and
average eﬃciencies for each market in the two treatments taking in account rounds from
21 to 45. We compute the average using these 25 rounds in order to get rid of ending and
starting eﬀects.
We ran three separate permutation tests using the data in Tables 1 and 2 comparing
the averages of the variables AWP, Quantity and Eﬃciency. Average weighted prices and
eﬃciency levels do vary across the two treatments significantly (p=.02 and p=.06) For
Quantity we do not find any significant treatment diﬀerence.
As mentioned above, some firms did go bankrupt in our experiments. We now look
at market behavior distinguishing between markets in which bankruptcies did and did
not occur. In Figure 8 we now show three series of average weighted prices for the 2F
treatment; we show again the overall prices series, but now also the series for those markets
that turned into duopolies and those that turned into monopolies. The Figure illustrates
that the Average Weighted Duopoly Price follows the Average Weighted price rather
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closely. Figure 9 shows the analogous comparison for quantities in the 2F treatment.
Figures 10 and 11 show the price and quantity series pertaining to the 3F treatment.
In this case we observe more diﬀerences between the diﬀerent data series.
Market AWP Quantity Efficiency
1 100 100 100
2 87.70 126 74
3 86.72 120. 04 79.96
4 100 100 100
5 100 100 100
6 100 100 100
7 100 100 100
8 100 100 100
9 100 100 100
10 74.87 85.16 63.96
11 100 100. 80 99. 2
12 63.04 123. 04 53.36
13 99.29 95.80 95. 8
14 100 100 100
Table 1. 2F Data
At this point we know that price-quantity competition leads to high prices. However,
it remains to be seen more in detail how these prices emerge. To understand the process
behind the regularities we have reported one needs to look at the data from the individual
markets. Appendix C presents two graphs for each market In the upper graph we see
the evolution of prices for firms involved in the market along time. In the lower graph we
see the evolution of quantities. The diﬀerent kinds of lines correspond to diﬀerent firms.
At first sight one can see that, for both treatments, there is considerable variation
across markets. Recall that there are 14 markets in the 2F treatment. Four of these
markets resulted in monopolies, and in all these the establishment of the monopoly is
preceded by a phase of heavy fighting for the market and subsequent bankruptcy by one
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of the firms. In 2F markets 7, 8 and 9 the monopoly emerges relatively early on, but in
market 12 the fighting continues until almost the end of the session.
In 8 of the 10 markets in which the duopolists persisted until the end, collusion near
the monopoly/Cournot equilibrium price was established at some point. The Figures
corresponding to 2F markets 1, 4, 5, 6, 9 ,13 and 14 reveal that in 7 of these 8 markets
collusion was established rather quickly. Market 2 is, in a sense, an intermediate case. In
markets 3 and 10 collusion was never established. In summary, in 2F markets we observe
two remarkable patterns, which both lead to high prices. One is collusion after some
adaptation or fighting time (markets 1,2,4,5,6,11,13 and 14). The other is the beginning
of a monopoly after one firm goes bankrupt as the result of a fight (markets 7,8,9 and
12). With respect to the markets where fighting never stopped, it seems reasonable to
speculate that, with more experience, firms would end up behaving according to one of
the two patterns identified above.
In nine 3F markets price patterns emerge in a similar way. In some markets some firms
leave the market after fighting has led to bankruptcies. Fights lead to duopolies (markets
1, 3 and 6) and then sometimes to monopolies (markets 2 and 4). In some markets firms
manage to collude after some time (markets 7,8 and 9). Since there are three firms the
time required to stabilize the market is longer and therefore we find more fights until the
end of the experiment (markets 1, 5 and 6). That is, the number of rounds required to
arrive to the monopoly price appears to be longer in the case of three firms. This could
explain the result of lower price and eﬃciency and higher quantity.
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Market AWP Quantity Efficiency
1 69.57 116. 32 70.35
2 86.70 109. 08 83.80
3 77.24 91.72 63.18
4 65.58 108. 92 69.45
5 68.89 95.20 76.31
6 49.70 139. 72 49.69
7 98.67 102 100
8 100 103. 28 98.75
9 100 102 100
Table 2. 3F Data
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Figure 8. Price Series (2F)
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5 Conclusions
In the standard Bertrand and Cournot models it is assumed that firms leave either price
or output for an automatic mechanism to determine. In this paper we present results
from experiments in which we relax this rather artificial feature head-on and allow firms
to simultaneously choose prices and quantities. This is, in our view, a somewhat more
natural approach and can also be seen as the first step towards the analysis of a dynamic
situation involving the carry-over of inventories. However, we do not see this as the ”right”
environment, but as one more element that will help us understand competition among
small numbers of firms. Markets are many and various. A complete view of competition
among the few can only arise from the study of a variety of potentially relevant market
environments.
We find that the kind of price-quantity competition we study leads mostly to behavior
like that of standard quantity competition. In our data, in line with the Chamberlin (1962)
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proposal, no outcome except that of sharing the market at the highest price appears to
be stable. In the absence of pure strategy equilibria for the stage game only the highest
price has any ”focal drawing power”. This outcome is sometimes the result of collusion,
while in other instances it arises after firms fighting for the market.
This results can neither be exclusively attributed to the fact that firms interact repeat-
edly with each other nor to the type of demand function we use, since we know that pure
price competition would - under the very same conditions - lead to much lower prices.
Increasing the number of firms does have the eﬀect of favoring consumers. However, this
may just be a transitory phenomenon, since pricing tends to the same pattern with both
two and three firms. We speculate that the addition of firms would lead to results in the
same line. More firms could lead to more fights and more bankruptcies. This will lead to
a longer adaptation phase, but with convergence to the same final price level.
Would modifications of the basic market conditions lead to diﬀerent behavior? Our
impression is that increasing marginal costs would not substantially alter results. A
downward sloping demand function could perhaps have the eﬀect of making collusion
more diﬃcult, but with few firms we still expect firms to reach a stable situation at high
prices.
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Appendix A: Instructions
This is an experiment about economic decision-making. The experiment is divided into
periods. Each of you will have the role of a firm. In each period firms have to decide which
quantity to produce and at which price to sell. To make your decision you should take into
account that:
1) You can produce any integer quantity between 0 and 102.
2) You can set any integer price between 0 and 100 ECU (experimental account units).
3) The production of each unit costs you 50 ECU’s, whether you sell it or not.
4) You are not the only firm oﬀering products, specifically there will be three firms oﬀering
products in each market.
5) At the beginning of the experiment it will be randomly determined which firms will be in
which market.
6) In each market the three firms will be the same period after period.
7) Consumers (simulated by computer) will always by 102 units.
8) If the firms set three diﬀerent prices, consumers will always start buying the cheaper units,
a. if the firm with the lowest price has produced less than 102 units then consumers
will buy the rest of the units up to 102 from the firm that has set the second lowest price
b. if the quantity produced by the two firms that have set lower prices is less than 102
then consumers will buy the rest of the units, up to 102, from the third firm.
c. if, in contrast, the firm with the lowest price has produced 102 units then consumers
will buy the 102 units from him and the firms with the higher prices will sell 0 units.
9) if the three firms set the same price and the sum of the quantities produced by the three
firms is smaller than or equal to 102 then the three firms will sell all produced units.
10) if, in contrast, the three firms set the same price and the sum of the quantities produced
is larger than 102 then consumers will buy in proportion to the quantities produced; i.e., if one
firms has produced X units, a second firm has produced Y units and the third firm has produced
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Z units, then the first firm will sell XX+Y+Z ∗ 102 units, the second firm will sell
Y
X+Y+Z ∗ 102
units and the third firm will sell ZX+Y+Z ∗ 102 and the rest of the units will not be sold.
11) if two firms set the same price, this price is the lowest and the quantity produced by these
two firms is larger than 102, then consumers will buy in proportion to the quantity produced,
i.e. if one firm has produced X units and the other firm has produced Y units then the first firm
will sell XX+Y ∗ 102 units, the second firm will sell
Y
X+Y ∗ 102 units and the rest of the units will
not be sold.
12) if two firms set the same price and it is not the lowest the same proportional rule
than under 11) will be applied subject to the remaining quantity up to 102; i.e. if the third firm
produces Z at the lowest price the quantities sold will be XX+Y ∗(102−Z) and
Y
X+Y ∗(102−Z).
13) if your firms makes losses it will be bankrupt, this means that the program will auto-
matically set a price and a quantity equal to zero for all remaining rounds, the other firms will
continue to be able freely set prices and quantities.
14) even if you are the owner of a bankrupted firm you will have to remain in your seat until
the end of the experiment to preserve anonymity.
On your computer you will see 5 screens:
1) The input screen where you will have to type your price and quantity in the corresponding
spaces.
2) The results screen will inform you about the prices and quantities of the other firms, as
well as about your earnings in the period and your accumulated earnings. You can press the
button ”OK” after you have read it and this screen will disappear in 20 seconds.
3) The history screen will inform you about prices, quantities and earnings of all previous
periods.
4) The waiting screen will appear whenever you have to wait till everybody is finished.
5) The total earnings screen will appear at the end of the experiment and will inform you of
your total earnings in Euros.
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You will not be allowed to communicate with each other during the experiment. If you have
any doubt about the instructions you may now ask publicly. If you have a question or doubt
during the experiment, raise your hand and we will talk to you personally.
The experiment has 50 periods You start with 20000 ECU’s which will always appear added
to your total earnings. You will be paid 2 cents of a Euro for each 100 EAU’s plus the 3 Euros
that you will already have received for your participation.
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Appendix B: Overall Tables11
Prices M1 M2 M3 M4 M5
Avg. Est.Dev. Avg. Est.Dev. Avg. Est.Dev. Avg. Est.Dev. Avg. Est.Dev.
1 to 5 70.00 27.39 53.00 9.75 33.20 17.43 81.14 18.06 60.80 21.91
6 to 10 69.90 26.57 56.67 20.95 81.50 8.63 100.00 0.00 100.00 0.00
11 to 15 78.68 25.52 77.00 11.51 73.10 11.45 100.00 0.00 100.00 0.00
16 to 20 100.00 0.00 90.50 9.75 75.16 4.69 100.00 0.00 100.00 0.00
21 to 25 100.00 0.00 82.00 10.95 83.70 4.13 100.00 0.00 100.00 0.00
26 to 30 100.00 0.00 76.00 8.94 84.40 12.60 100.00 0.00 100.00 0.00
31 to 35 100.00 0.00 81.00 12.45 90.00 4.85 100.00 0.00 100.00 0.00
36 to 40 100.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 96.60 2.16 100.00 0.00 100.00 0.00
41 to 45 100.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 63.40 14.42 100.00 0.00 100.00 0.00
46 to 50 100.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 57.50 10.61 100.00 0.00 100.00 0.00
Quantities
Avg. Est.Dev. Avg. Est.Dev. Avg. Est.Dev. Avg. Est.Dev. Avg. Est.Dev.
1 to 5 124.00 41.14 112.00 55.41 160.00 22.36 92.60 17.11 80.40 33.28
6 to 10 160.00 22.36 108.00 38.34 112.00 21.68 100.00 0.00 100.00 0.00
11 to 15 94.20 37.53 100.00 0.00 137.40 25.67 100.00 0.00 100.00 0.00
16 to 20 100.00 0.00 121.00 28.81 122.00 0.71 100.00 0.00 100.00 0.00
21 to 25 100.00 0.00 158.00 42.66 110.20 8.23 100.00 0.00 100.00 0.00
26 to 30 100.00 0.00 122.00 25.88 120.00 27.39 100.00 0.00 100.00 0.00
31 to 35 100.00 0.00 150.00 50.00 100.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 100.00 0.00
36 to 40 100.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 100.00 0.00
41 to 45 100.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 170.00 27.39 100.00 0.00 100.00 0.00
46 to 50 100.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 110.00 14.14 100.00 0.00 100.00 0.00
Prices M6 M7 M8 M9 M10
Avg. Est.Dev. Avg. Est.Dev. Avg. Est.Dev. Avg. Est.Dev. Avg. Est.Dev.
1 to 5 85.96 15.28 55.20 11.08 49.82 9.35 53.02 6.50 53.36 5.60
6 to 10 100.00 0.00 50.08 0.17 58.47 24.30 43.40 6.54 51.00 11.40
11 to 15 100.00 0.00 62.00 21.68 60.00 30.16 59.79 4.35 41.26 12.35
16 to 20 100.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 92.00 17.89 67.14 25.33
21 to 25 100.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 81.00 19.95
26 to 30 100.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 70.47 24.44
31 to 35 100.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 75.44 11.44
36 to 40 100.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 81.95 3.48
41 to 45 100.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 65.47 19.63
46 to 50 100.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 47.50 0.71
m m m
Quantities
Avg. Est.Dev. Avg. Est.Dev. Avg. Est.Dev. Avg. Est.Dev. Avg. Est.Dev.
1 to 5 102.00 2.83 160.00 41.83 154.00 45.06 166.00 13.87 108.00 16.05
6 to 10 100.00 0.00 136.60 60.22 126.00 76.03 166.00 46.69 119.00 5.48
11 to 15 100.00 0.00 100.40 99.50 112.00 57.62 125.80 49.43 143.20 52.17
16 to 20 100.00 0.00 90.00 22.36 100.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 78.40 83.70
21 to 25 100.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 45.00 45.96
26 to 30 100.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 82.00 41.02
31 to 35 100.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 90.80 30.22
36 to 40 100.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 90.00 28.28
41 to 45 100.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 118.00 37.01
46 to 50 100.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 160.00 56.57
m m m
2F Overall Tables (1)
11Tables show price and quantity averages and standard deviations for every particular market. These
statistics are computed for batches of five periods. "m", "d" and "t" denote that the market ends with
monopoly, duopoly or triopoly respectively.
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Prices M11 M12 M13 M14
Avg. Est.Dev. Avg. Est.Dev. Avg. Est.Dev. Avg. Est.Dev.
1 to 5 57.36 4.93 49.76 3.26 62.71 7.08 62.20 15.18
6 to 10 63.60 12.72 34.24 27.95 88.73 2.89 100.00 0.00
11 to 15 97.60 5.37 62.08 11.41 95.32 2.12 90.00 22.36
16 to 20 100.00 0.00 66.28 15.77 97.79 0.24 100.00 0.00
21 to 25 100.00 0.00 78.20 19.81 98.63 0.29 100.00 0.00
26 to 30 100.00 0.00 71.85 25.29 99.16 0.29 100.00 0.00
31 to 35 100.00 0.00 59.76 7.99 99.47 0.00 100.00 0.00
36 to 40 100.00 0.00 53.00 2.39 99.47 0.00 100.00 0.00
41 to 45 100.00 0.00 52.41 4.27 99.69 0.28 100.00 0.00
46 to 50 100.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 100.00 0.00
m
Quantities
Avg. Est.Dev. Avg. Est.Dev. Avg. Est.Dev. Avg. Est.Dev.
1 to 5 114.00 11.40 115.20 34.32 92.20 11.26 100.00 0.00
6 to 10 100.00 0.00 87.00 37.78 97.40 1.34 100.00 0.00
11 to 15 102.00 4.47 84.00 23.82 95.80 1.10 110.00 22.36
16 to 20 100.00 0.00 99.60 39.09 95.00 0.00 100.00 0.00
21 to 25 100.00 0.00 80.00 39.62 95.00 0.00 100.00 0.00
26 to 30 100.00 0.00 121.80 62.14 95.00 0.00 100.00 0.00
31 to 35 100.00 0.00 109.60 66.05 95.00 0.00 100.00 0.00
36 to 40 100.00 0.00 146.20 35.35 95.00 0.00 100.00 0.00
41 to 45 104.00 8.94 157.60 42.09 99.00 2.24 100.00 0.00
46 to 50 100.00 0.00 50.50 70.00 100.00 0.00 100.00 0.00
m
2F Overall Tables (2)
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Prices M1 M2 M3 M4 M5
Avg. Est.Dev. Avg. Est.Dev. Avg. Est.Dev. Avg. Est.Dev. Avg. Est.Dev.
1 to 5 39.29 37.52 47.92 19.50 53.49 3.45 31.17 22.95 51.58 2.00
6 to 10 55.86 38.44 54.98 8.97 39.85 17.72 51.80 0.73 49.91 0.22
11 to 15 62.92 14.41 64.46 12.10 47.88 21.56 60.56 7.30 52.31 3.42
16 to 20 80.69 20.86 55.21 7.19 51.18 0.82 54.56 3.63 50.60 1.23
21 to 25 51.00 36.47 53.08 12.04 80.75 17.65 54.32 5.50 79.58 4.36
26 to 30 67.97 28.38 80.40 43.83 95.02 4.95 58.16 6.92 68.04 8.44
31 to 35 79.02 26.57 100.00 0.00 58.35 12.92 54.58 3.76 60.66 11.00
36 to 40 71.52 21.91 100.00 0.00 67.79 14.37 60.85 17.08 69.68 8.77
41 to 45 78.35 24.86 100.00 0.00 84.29 21.69 100.00 0.00 66.50 5.29
46 to 50 78.51 24.58 100.00 0.00 99.80 0.45 100.00 0.00 78.78 14.67
d m d m t
Quantities
Avg. Est.Dev. Avg. Est.Dev. Avg. Est.Dev. Avg. Est.Dev. Avg. Est.Dev.
1 to 5 169.60 110.29 133.60 38.37 159.60 81.92 184.80 47.40 175.00 12.75
6 to 10 100.60 57.06 136.60 62.07 165.40 64.16 117.00 40.47 137.80 23.49
11 to 15 132.60 27.02 135.20 58.46 89.60 57.08 81.40 31.80 104.60 13.79
16 to 20 104.00 68.47 158.00 51.45 132.20 57.56 112.60 32.00 90.20 20.75
21 to 25 110.20 73.69 139.80 65.93 60.40 24.10 115.40 46.40 63.00 30.32
26 to 30 110.60 61.82 103.60 39.66 102.00 1.00 85.20 48.44 111.40 44.28
31 to 35 122.00 44.72 102.00 0.00 130.80 56.48 119.20 56.93 116.20 37.51
36 to 40 105.80 3.83 102.00 0.00 85.20 69.92 122.80 38.11 92.20 10.62
41 to 45 133.00 41.14 102.00 0.00 80.20 44.46 102.00 0.00 93.20 34.04
46 to 50 134.40 40.17 102.00 0.00 113.00 24.67 102.00 0.00 94.60 57.03
d m d m t
Prices M6 M7 M8 M9
Avg. Est.Dev. Avg. Est.Dev. Avg. Est.Dev. Avg.
1 to 5 61.70 2.03 51.50 12.32 55.62 8.28 49.02 11.09
6 to 10 72.19 6.44 57.55 6.00 57.87 13.42 83.33 17.95
11 to 15 58.71 4.10 54.59 5.31 69.63 14.67 89.80 22.81
16 to 20 67.04 4.43 56.98 5.75 100.00 0.00 100.00 0.00
21 to 25 55.62 3.56 93.33 9.43 100.00 0.00 100.00 0.00
26 to 30 48.88 1.66 100.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 100.00 0.00
31 to 35 48.18 2.14 100.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 100.00 0.00
36 to 40 48.44 1.77 100.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 100.00 0.00
41 to 45 47.39 19.96 100.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 100.00 0.00
46 to 50 40.00 41.83 91.84 17.69 77.98 23.98 96.00 8.94
d t t t
Quantities
Avg. Est.Dev. Avg. Est.Dev. Avg. Est.Dev. Avg. Est.Dev.
1 to 5 153.20 28.73 105.20 8.76 182.20 43.76 138.40 31.67
6 to 10 139.80 44.80 121.20 27.22 76.00 21.62 102.00 0.00
11 to 15 135.00 37.46 135.80 24.80 96.40 40.46 126.80 34.22
16 to 20 123.00 3.81 127.40 32.21 99.20 5.54 102.00 0.00
21 to 25 161.40 35.00 102.00 0.00 102.80 0.84 102.00 0.00
26 to 30 173.80 17.04 102.00 0.00 102.80 0.84 102.00 0.00
31 to 35 160.00 42.87 102.00 0.00 103.60 0.89 102.00 0.00
36 to 40 109.40 2.61 102.00 0.00 103.20 0.45 102.00 0.00
41 to 45 94.00 78.96 102.00 0.00 104.00 1.00 102.00 0.00
46 to 50 60.00 54.77 122.00 30.20 125.20 43.65 129.20 60.82
d t t t
3F Overall Tables
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Appendix C: Graphs12
12For every market the upper picture represents individual price series and the lower individual quantity
series (Pictures start on the next page). The first fourteen markets shown come from 2F. The next nine
come from 3F. For every market the upper picture shows prices and the lower one quantities.
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